Internal logging and monitoring platforms have become essential components of modern enterprise infrastructure, providing centralized visibility across distributed systems. However, these powerful tools often become unintended sources of sensitive information exposure, creating significant security implications that organizations frequently overlook. This blog explores how security professionals can leverage these platforms for comprehensive security assessments while highlighting critical misconfigurations that demand immediate attention.

The Hidden Security Value of Logging Platforms

Centralized logging solutions like Datadog, Kibana, Elasticsearch, and Sumo Logic aggregate vast amounts of operational data from across enterprise environments. While these platforms excel at providing operational insights, they inadvertently become repositories of sensitive information including API keys, credentials, connection strings, and authentication tokens. During security assessments, these platforms represent high-value targets due to their extensive reach across organizational infrastructure.

The appeal of targeting logging platforms stems from several factors. First, they contain historical data spanning months or years, providing access to credentials that may have been exposed during past troubleshooting sessions. Second, querying these platforms mimics legitimate administrative behavior, making detection extremely challenging. Third, they often maintain broad access permissions across development, staging, and production environments, offering comprehensive visibility into organizational assets.

Common Misconfigurations in Logging Infrastructure

Security teams frequently encounter specific misconfigurations when examining logging platforms. Authentication bypass represents one of the most critical issues, where platforms remain accessible without proper credentials due to incomplete security hardening. During penetration testing engagements, DTS Solution’s Red Team identifies instances where Kibana dashboards, Elasticsearch clusters, or monitoring consoles lack proper access controls.

Excessive logging scope creates another significant vulnerability. Organizations often configure their logging systems to capture everything, including sensitive authentication flows, error messages containing credentials, and deployment logs with environment variables. This approach generates massive data volumes while inadvertently exposing critical secrets throughout the logging infrastructure.

Inadequate log filtering compounds these problems. Without proper scrubbing mechanisms, applications continuously log sensitive information including database connection strings, third-party service credentials, and internal API keys. These exposed secrets become permanent fixtures within log archives, accessible to anyone with platform access.

Common Platform Vulnerabilities and Exploitation

Elasticsearch / Kibana Environments

Kibana is widely used for visualizing Elasticsearch data and often serves as the central logging repository. A common issue arises when instances are misconfigured and left publicly accessible without authentication. Mismanagement can also include the use of default credentials or overly permissive access controls on dashboard interfaces.

Effective search patterns with Kibana Query Language (KQL) include:

  • Credential hunting: message:*password* OR message:*credential* OR message:*secret*

  • API key discovery: message:*api_key* OR message:*apikey* OR message:*api-key*

  • Token filtering: message:*token* AND NOT (message:*validate* OR message:*invalid*)

  • AWS-specific searches: message:*AKIA* OR tags:aws_access_key for identifying exposed cloud credentials often found in deployment logs.

Datadog and Unified Monitoring Platforms

Datadog integrates metrics, traces, and logs into a single monitoring platform. In many cases, organizations provide broad access to development teams but fail to properly sanitize logged data. This can lead to exposure of sensitive information, including:

  • API keys in application traces

  • Environment variables logged with secrets

  • Error messages containing connection strings

  • Deployment pipeline logs revealing infrastructure credentials

Search patterns that help uncover sensitive data include:

  • General credentials: “password” OR “credential” OR “secret”

  • API tokens: “api_key” OR “apikey” OR “api-key”

  • Cloud service keys: “access_key” OR “accesskey” OR “access-key”

  • Database details: “connection string” OR “connectionstring”

Datadog’s Application Performance Monitoring features are particularly prone to capturing sensitive data during API calls, database interactions, and third-party service integrations, making these searches especially valuable.

Splunk Enterprise Implementations

Splunk is often deployed to aggregate security logs across environments, making it a high-value target for credential and configuration exposure. Its advanced search capabilities can surface sensitive information such as:

  • Authentication failures containing attempted credentials

  • Network device logs with configuration details

  • Application deployment logs embedding secrets

  • System administration activities revealing privileged account usage

Internal logging and monitoring platforms have become essential components of modern enterprise infrastructure, providing centralized visibility across distributed systems. However, these powerful tools often become unintended sources of sensitive information exposure, creating significant security implications that organizations frequently overlook. This blog explores how security professionals can leverage these platforms for comprehensive security assessments while highlighting critical misconfigurations that demand immediate attention.

The Hidden Security Value of Logging Platforms

Centralized logging solutions like Datadog, Kibana, Elasticsearch, and Sumo Logic aggregate vast amounts of operational data from across enterprise environments. While these platforms excel at providing operational insights, they inadvertently become repositories of sensitive information including API keys, credentials, connection strings, and authentication tokens. During security assessments, these platforms represent high-value targets due to their extensive reach across organizational infrastructure.

The appeal of targeting logging platforms stems from several factors. First, they contain historical data spanning months or years, providing access to credentials that may have been exposed during past troubleshooting sessions. Second, querying these platforms mimics legitimate administrative behavior, making detection extremely challenging. Third, they often maintain broad access permissions across development, staging, and production environments, offering comprehensive visibility into organizational assets.

Common Misconfigurations in Logging Infrastructure

Security teams frequently encounter specific misconfigurations when examining logging platforms. Authentication bypass represents one of the most critical issues, where platforms remain accessible without proper credentials due to incomplete security hardening. During penetration testing engagements, DTS Solution’s Red Team identifies instances where Kibana dashboards, Elasticsearch clusters, or monitoring consoles lack proper access controls.

Excessive logging scope creates another significant vulnerability. Organizations often configure their logging systems to capture everything, including sensitive authentication flows, error messages containing credentials, and deployment logs with environment variables. This approach generates massive data volumes while inadvertently exposing critical secrets throughout the logging infrastructure.

Inadequate log filtering compounds these problems. Without proper scrubbing mechanisms, applications continuously log sensitive information, including database connection strings, third-party service credentials, and internal API keys. These exposed secrets become permanent fixtures within log archives, accessible to anyone with platform access.

Common Platform Vulnerabilities and Exploitation

Elasticsearch / Kibana Environments

Kibana is widely used for visualizing Elasticsearch data and often serves as the central logging repository. A common issue arises when instances are misconfigured and left publicly accessible without authentication. Mismanagement can also include the use of default credentials or overly permissive access controls on dashboard interfaces.

Effective search patterns with Kibana Query Language (KQL) include:

  • Credential hunting: message:*password* OR message:*credential* OR message:*secret*

  • API key discovery: message:*api_key* OR message:*apikey* OR message:*api-key*

  • Token filtering: message:*token* AND NOT (message:*validate* OR message:*invalid*)

  • AWS-specific searches: message:*AKIA* OR tags:aws_access_key for identifying exposed cloud credentials often found in deployment logs.

Datadog and Unified Monitoring Platforms

Datadog integrates metrics, traces, and logs into a single monitoring platform. In many cases, organizations provide broad access to development teams but fail to properly sanitize logged data. This can lead to exposure of sensitive information, including:

  • API keys in application traces

  • Environment variables logged with secrets

  • Error messages containing connection strings

  • Deployment pipeline logs revealing infrastructure credentials

Search patterns that help uncover sensitive data include:

  • General credentials: “password” OR “credential” OR “secret”

  • API tokens: “api_key” OR “apikey” OR “api-key”

  • Cloud service keys: “access_key” OR “accesskey” OR “access-key”

  • Database details: “connection string” OR “connectionstring”

Datadog’s Application Performance Monitoring features are particularly prone to capturing sensitive data during API calls, database interactions, and third-party service integrations, making these searches especially valuable.

Splunk Enterprise Implementations

Splunk is often deployed to aggregate security logs across environments, making it a high-value target for credential and configuration exposure. Its advanced search capabilities can surface sensitive information such as:

  • Authentication failures containing attempted credentials

  • Network device logs with configuration details

  • Application deployment logs embedding secrets

  • System administration activities revealing privileged account usage

The Role of Advanced Monitoring Solutions

Modern security assessment methodologies increasingly rely on sophisticated monitoring platforms that can detect these configuration weaknesses. HawkEye represents one such solution, providing comprehensive analysis capabilities specifically designed for identifying logging and monitoring misconfigurations. By systematically examining access controls, data exposure patterns, and authentication mechanisms, these platforms help security teams identify vulnerabilities before they can be exploited.

HawkEye’s approach to logging assessment extends beyond simple credential discovery. The platform examines log retention policies, access control implementations, and data classification schemes to provide comprehensive security posture analysis. This methodology proves particularly valuable when evaluating complex environments with multiple logging solutions and distributed access patterns.

Attack Chain Development Through Log Analysis

Successful security assessments often involve chaining discoveries from logging platforms into comprehensive attack paths. Initial credential discoveries from log files can provide access to version control systems, cloud platforms, or internal services. These secondary access points frequently contain additional credentials or configuration information that extends attack capabilities further.

Consider a scenario where application error logs contain database connection strings. These credentials might provide access to internal databases containing user information, configuration data, or additional service credentials. The cascading effect of each discovery can lead to comprehensive system compromise through legitimate access paths rather than traditional exploitation techniques.

Version control integration represents another valuable attack vector. Credentials discovered in logging platforms often provide access to private repositories containing infrastructure configurations, deployment scripts, and additional sensitive information. Automated scanning of these repositories using tools designed for secret detection can rapidly expand the scope of discovered credentials.

Detection Strategies and Defensive Measures

Organizations must implement comprehensive defensive strategies to protect against logging platform exploitation. Access control mechanisms should enforce principle of least privilege, ensuring that logging platform access remains restricted to authorized personnel only. Multi-factor authentication requirements add additional protection layers against credential-based attacks.

Log sanitization represents a critical defensive measure. Implementing automated scrubbing mechanisms prevents sensitive information from entering log streams initially. These systems should identify patterns matching common credential formats, connection strings, and API keys before logs reach centralized storage.

Monitoring query patterns within logging platforms can help detect malicious activity. Unusual search patterns targeting credential-related terms, extensive historical data access, or queries from unfamiliar user accounts may indicate compromise attempts. Alerting systems should notify security teams when suspicious search behavior occurs.

Regular credential rotation policies reduce the impact of exposed secrets within historical logs. Even if credentials become exposed through logging, time-limited validity windows minimize potential damage. This approach requires coordination between development teams and security personnel to ensure proper implementation.

Conclusion

Internal logging and monitoring platforms present both significant security opportunities and substantial risks for modern organizations. While these systems provide essential operational capabilities, their centralized nature and extensive data collection create attractive targets for security threats. Organizations must balance operational requirements with security considerations through comprehensive defensive strategies.

Security professionals conducting assessments should approach logging platforms systematically, understanding both their technical capabilities and common misconfigurations. The methodologies outlined provide frameworks for effective evaluation while emphasizing the importance of responsible disclosure and remediation guidance.

As organizations continue expanding their logging and monitoring capabilities, security considerations must remain paramount. Proper implementation of access controls, data sanitization, and monitoring mechanisms ensures that these powerful operational tools enhance rather than compromise organizational security posture. Through careful attention to these details, organizations can leverage the full benefits of centralized logging while maintaining robust security controls.

The WebClient Service: Unlocking Protocol Flexibility

The most significant breakthrough in escaping port 445 restrictions involves manipulating the WebClient service on target systems. This Windows component enables WebDAV functionality, which fundamentally changes how authentication coercion behaves during subsequent attacks.

Traditional authentication coercion techniques produce NetNTLMv2 hashes encapsulated within SMB packets. These authentication attempts cannot be relayed to Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) services due to protocol restrictions. However, when the WebClient service operates on the target system, authentication coercion generates WebDAV-formatted requests instead.

WebDAV operates as an HTTP-based protocol, making it compatible with LDAP relay attacks. This compatibility enables two powerful computer account takeover techniques:

Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)

RBCD attacks manipulate Active Directory attributes to grant delegation rights to attacker-controlled accounts. Once established, these rights enable impersonation of high-privilege accounts without requiring password knowledge.

Shadow Credentials Attack

Shadow Credentials involves adding attacker-controlled certificate information to target computer accounts. This technique enables authentication as the compromised system using legitimate Kerberos protocols.

Technical Implementation Process

The complete attack chain requires careful orchestration of multiple components:

Phase 1: Initial Access

  • Execute NTLM relay attack targeting SMB service
  • Establish SOCKS proxy connection for persistent access
  • Verify administrative privileges on target system

Phase 2: Service Manipulation

  • Connect to the target SCM through an authenticated session
  • Enable WebClient service using native Windows tools
  • Confirm service activation without triggering alerts

Phase 3: Protocol Expansion

  • Perform authentication coercion against WebClient-enabled target
  • Capture WebDAV-formatted authentication requests
  • Relay authentication to the domain controller LDAP service

Phase 4: Account Takeover

  • Execute RBCD or Shadow Credentials attack
  • Establish persistent access to target computer account
  • Enable broader lateral movement capabilities

Operational Security Considerations

Successful implementation requires attention to several critical factors:

Detection Avoidance: Native Windows utilities generate significantly fewer EDR alerts compared to third-party penetration testing tools. However, service manipulation activities may still produce audit logs requiring careful timing and operational planning.

LDAP Prerequisites: Target domain controllers must lack LDAP signing enforcement or channel binding protections. While these security measures are becoming more common, many organizations still operate with vulnerable configurations.

Service Dependencies: WebClient service activation may impact system performance or stability. Security professionals should understand potential operational effects before implementation.

Real-World Application Scenarios

This technique proves particularly valuable in several common engagement scenarios:

Corporate Network Assessments: Organizations with robust EDR deployments that block traditional credential extraction methods require alternative approaches. Service manipulation provides effective lateral movement without triggering defensive systems.

Red Team Operations: Long-term engagements benefit from persistent access methods that avoid detection. The WebClient technique enables sustained network presence while maintaining operational security. Organizations seeking comprehensive red team assessment services can leverage these advanced techniques to thoroughly evaluate their defensive capabilities.

Compliance Testing: Regulatory frameworks often require demonstration of lateral movement capabilities. This approach satisfies compliance requirements while respecting organizational security investments.

Defensive Recommendations

Security teams should implement multiple layers of protection against these advanced techniques:

SMB Hardening: Enforce SMB signing requirements across all systems to prevent NTLM relay attacks. Disable legacy SMB versions that lack modern security features.

Service Monitoring: Deploy monitoring solutions that track service state changes, particularly for security-sensitive services like WebClient. Unusual activation patterns may indicate compromise.

LDAP Security: Enable LDAP signing and channel binding on all domain controllers. These protections prevent credential relay attacks regardless of the initial compromise method.

Network Segmentation: Implement micro-segmentation to limit lateral movement possibilities. Even a successful account compromise should face additional network barriers.

Conclusion

The evolution of endpoint security pushes security professionals to develop more sophisticated attack methods. Traditional SMB port bypasses relied on noisy credential extraction, but modern methods use legitimate Windows functions for stealth.

Using Service Control Manager manipulation and WebClient service activation improves lateral movement. Understanding these techniques and defenses helps organizations assess risks and develop strategies.

Effective security must go beyond signature detection, addressing protocol vulnerabilities and not just behavioral analysis. Attackers will find alternative paths, so security must eliminate vulnerabilities and implement defense-in-depth strategies that work even if controls are bypassed.